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ACCOUNTING FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Daniel H. Cole*
n 1991, a Harvard economist told a tax policy group that envi-
ronmental regulations would cost the American economy three
percent of real Gross National Product ("GNP") annually by 2005,
mainly by consuming capital stock that otherwise could be invested
in productive activities.' This might be true, but just what would it
prove? Certainly it would prove that environmental regulations are
costly according to standard measures of economic production.
However, it would not prove either that environmental regulations
are too expensive (though they might be) or that they impose real
losses to economic welfare (though they might).
The problem, simply put, is that GNP and other standard
measures of economic production fail to adequately reflect the
actual economic-welfare impacts of environmental policies. While
they are often taken as proxies for social welfare or quality of life,
they are, in fact, nothing of the kind.2 GNP measures only
"transactions that pass through the market," based on total
expenditures on final sales of goods and services.3 It does not
incorporate costs and benefits arising outside the market, including
many relating to environmental degradation and protection.4 While
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1. Better Understanding of Regulations' Cost to Society Needed, Economist
Says, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) (Sept. 13, 1991).
2. See JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC CHOICE 127 (2d ed. 1980).
3. FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, GREEN INC. 98-99 (1995).
4. See id. at 99-100.
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GNP is very good at measuring short-term performance of the
economy, it systematically underestimates (or simply fails to
incorporate) the costs to society of pollution damage, the benefits of
pollution prevention, the costs associated with depletion of natural
resource stocks, and the benefits of resource conservation. To the
extent that these environmental costs and benefits are reflected at
all in the national income accounts, they tend to be perversely
distorted.
First, consider the treatment of pollution in GNP computations.
Suppose a factory produces toxic wastes, which it dumps without
protection, leading to soil and groundwater contamination. Some
people in the neighboring community fall ill as a consequence.
Common sense would tell us that those illnesses, and other
damages resulting from the toxic wastes, constitute costs to social
welfare. However, national income figures largely ignore these
costs. GNP will reflect marginal losses in productivity among the
affected population, but only to the extent that their illnesses make
them less productive. The largest part of the (very real) costs of
pollution may have no direct impacts on production, as measured
by transactions occurring in the market. Those costs will not,
therefore, be reflected in GNP computations.
Even worse, toxic waste dumping is actually likely to cause
national income to rise statistically by contributing to increased
production in a variety of industries, including the industry that
dumps (but does not have to pay for) the waste, the health-care
industry (which treats the people made ill by the toxic wastes), and
the environmental clean-up industry (which will remediate the
waste site if someone 'pays for it). So, as far as the national income
statistics are concerned, toxic waste discharges paradoxically
provide net economic benefits for society. Of course, these benefits
are purely statistical; they mask real (but excluded) costs to
economic welfare. For example, the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in
Alaska actually increased recorded growth in the American
economy;5 the environmental damages resulting from the spill were
not counted against GNP because they fell outside the market, but
5. Getting Physical; National-Income Accounts Do Not Properly Value Natural
Resources, But Changing That Can Be Difficult, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 1989,
at 53.
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the costs incurred in cleaning-up Prince William Sound were
market transactions and, therefore, contributed to GNP.6 This is
obviously perverse, as any respectable economist would admit.
The treatment of the natural resource base in national income
accounts is equally perverse. When natural resources, including
commodities like oil and gas, and non-commodity resources like
clean air and water, are consumed in the production process, there
are obvious costs to the economy. Some of those costs, particularly
those relating to the consumption of commodity resources, are
reflected in GNP figures to the extent that producers bear resource
extraction costs and pay scarcity prices for resources. But to the ex-
tent resources, such as clean air and water, are used without cost to
the user, their depletion is not reflected in the national income
accounts. A 1989 article in The Economist summed up the basic
problem in this simple, but graphic way:
Imagine a country that dug up all its coal, burnt down all its
forests, killed off all its wildlife, filled its air with smoke and its
rivers with dirt. Would that country thus become poorer? Yes, says
common sense. No, say national-income accounts."
This is hardly an exaggeration. A group of economists from the
World Resources Institute ("WRI") conducted a study of econom-
ic growth in Costa Rica between 1970 and 1989.' According to
conventional measures, the Costa Rican economy grew at an
average annual rate of 4.6 percent during that period.9 However,
this growth rate did not include costs related to the depletion of
natural resource stocks, including soil fertility, forest resources,
and fisheries.' ° In fact, during the period studied, the Costa Ri-
can fishing industry began to collapse, and massive deforestation
greatly reduced the country's natural productivity." The WRI
economists estimated that Costa Rica's growth rate between 1970
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See R. SOLORZANO ET AL., ACCOuNTs OVERDUE: NATURAL RESOURCE DE-
PRECIATION IN COSTA RICA (1991).
9. Id.
10. Id.
l1. Id.
1996]
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and 1989 would have to be reduced by approximately one-quarter
to reflect the declining stock of natural resources.
2
In a similar study of economic growth in Indonesia between
1971 and 1984, WRI economists found that GNP would fall from
seven to four percent, after factoring in the depletion of timber
supplies, known oil reserves, and soil productivity. 3 It should be
noted that these studies relied exclusively on existing market
values for standing timber, known oil reserves, and productive
land; no economic sleight-of-hand was involved.' 4
By failing to account for the (real) costs of environmental
degradation, national income accounts also make pollution-pre-
Svention and resource conservation policies appear more expensive
than they actually are. After all, if those policies impose regulato-
ry costs that are reflected in GNP to ameliorate problems whose
costs are not reflected in GNP, the policies unavoidably will
appear costly to welfare. But, again, those statistical losses may
mask real gains in welfare. If the national income figures were
adjusted to more accurately reflect the social benefits from envi-
ronmental regulation, "the effect..,. on 'true' productivity, would
be less negative" than commonly estimated - "or even posi-
tive." 5
The same problem of the failure to account for pollution costs
and (regulatory) prevention benefits pervades standard cost-bene-
fit analyses, which increasingly influence policy, particularly in
the United States. The costs of environmental regulations are
comparatively easy to estimate; they are mostly born by market-
participants (industry and consumers), and thus are commonly
denominated in dollars. The benefits of environmental regula-
tions, however, which include breathing cleaner air and water, are
not easily converted into dollar signs. Consequently, cost-benefit
analyses tend to be biased against regulatory policies aimed at
12. Id.
13. This study is discussed in J. Walter Milon, Environmental and Natural Re-
sources in National Economic Accounts, in INTEGRATING ECONOMIC AND ECO-
LOGICAL INDICATORS 131, 138 (J. Walter Milon & Jason F. Shogren eds., 1995).
14. Id.
15. Robert H. Haveman & Gregory B. Christiansen, Environmental Regula-
tions and Productivity Growth, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE U.S.
ECONOMY 55, 75 (Henry M. Peskin et al., eds., 1981).
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pollution prevention and resource conservation. The only way to
remove that bias is to adjust the analyses to better reflect the
actual (though difficult to quantify) welfare benefits of regulation.
The argument is not, however, that cost-benefit analysis or
conventional measures of economic production should be
scrapped. They are useful, even imperative, tools of economic
and policy analysis. It would be morally questionable to ignore
the costs and benefits of policy alternatives in circumstances
where problems are many and funds are limited. Moreover, the
information provided by national income statistics has some (lim-
ited) relevance for environmental protection. Conventional nation-
al income measures can predict and explain, to some extent, the
level of political commitment to environmental protection. A
recent article by economists Gene M. Grossman and Alan B.
Krueger found that "economic growth brings an initial phase of
deterioration followed by a subsequent phase of improvement."' 6
The turning point occurs at approximately $8000 per capita GNP.
While GNP computations and cost-benefit analyses are useful,
perhaps even indispensable, tools of policy analysis, they should
be modified to better, more realistically, account for pollution
costs and regulatory benefits. This is hardly a new claim, though
it remains somewhat controversial. Economists have long under-
stood the limitations of the current system of national accounts.
But the issue gains increased significance with the emergence of
the "Cost-Benefit State,"' 7 in which cost-benefit analyses are
becoming virtual decision rules for policy making. Without better
accounting for (non-market) environmental costs and benefits, the
Cost-Benefit State will be biased against pollution prevention and
resource conservation; it will continue to paint rosy statistical
pictures of the economy, even if real welfare deteriorates.
The task, then, as we approach the twenty-first century is to
devise workable criteria and methods for refining cost-benefit
analysis (on the micro-level) and national income accounting (on
the macro-level), to more accurately assess the real environmental
16. Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Envi-
ronment, 110 QUART. J. ECON. 353, 369 (1995).
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Momenfts, and the Cost-
Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247 (1996).
1996]
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costs of pollution and resource consumption and corresponding
benefits from pollution prevention and resource conservation.
However, this is more easily said than done. Economists have
been working at it since at least the mid-1940s, when Sir John
Hicks, a Nobel Prize-winning economist from Britain, showed
that the most relevant indicator of economic welfare is not Gross
National Product, but net income, defined as the amount a coun-
try can consume without depleting its capital stock. 8 If "capital
stock" is defined to include all natural resources used in or affect-
ed by production, then Hicks's definition of "income" could also
serve to define the concept of "sustainable development." Howev-
er, to date economists have had little success designing workable
adjustments to national income calculations. One early effort by
James Tobin and William Nordhaus attempted to refine GNP by:
(1) subtracting pollution costs, (2) excluding "regrettable necessi-
ties," such as police protection, national defense, and possibly
some costs of environmental regulation, and (3) adding in the
estimated value of certain nonmarket goods, such as household
productive activities and leisure.' 9 Nordhaus and Tobin labelled
their accounting device "Measure of Economic Welfare" or
"MEW".' But, like more recent efforts to amend the system of
national accounts, their proposal was plagued by a fundamental
problem: they could not provide an "objective" (i.e., non-contro-
versial) method for valuing nonmarket goods and bads.
This valuation problem is the greatest hurdle facing those who
would turn the national income accounts into more realistic mea-
sures of sustainable development and efforts to reduce the anti-
regulatory bias of cost-benefit analyses. Many nonmarket measur-
ing tools have been offered as solutions to the valuation problem,
including contingent valuation, the travel-cost method, hedonic
pricing, and existence valuation.2 But they all remain controver-
sial. The contingent valuation method, for example, asks people
18. See J. R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL (2d ed. 1946).
19. See William Nordhaus & James Tobin, Is Economic Growth Obsolete?, in
5 EcONOMIc GROWTH, FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY COLLOQUIUM 1, 4 (1972).
20. Id.
21. For brief descriptions of these different valuation methods and their prob-
lems, see V. Kerry Smith, Nonmarket Valuation of Environmental Resources: An
Interpretive Appraisal, 59 LAND ECON. 1 (1993).
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how much they would pay to protect an environmental amenity
or, conversely, how much they would accept to allow it to be
destroyed or taken away.22 The problem with this approach is
that surveyed individuals are not forced to put their money where
their stated preferences are; consequently, they have no incentive
to avoid over- or under-estimating their individual valuations of
nonmarket goods and bads.23
The travel-cost method avoids the valuation problem by mea-
suring only how much people actually spend getting to and from
environmental amenities, such as national parks.2 ' However, the
costs actually incurred may constitute only a fraction of the total
value of national parks and other environmental resources.
Another potential alternative to the sticky problem of valuing
nonmarket goods and bads is to convert them to market goods
and bads through commodification and privatization. According
to "free market environmentalists," defining property rights in
natural resources such as air and water would bring virtually all
the costs and benefits related to their use (and conservation)
within markets, where dollar values would be attached.25 This
would eviscerate the valuation problem, so that cost-benefit anal-
yses and standard measures of national income could capture all
the costs and benefits of activities relating to the environment.
26
This, however, is not a solution. It simply trades one set of
problems for another. The valuation problem is exchanged for the
even more difficult (if not impossible) problem of drawing clear
and defensible boundaries in resources such as the atmosphere. In
addition, the process of privatization would likely entail high
transaction costs. After all, the process would create winners
(those who get entitlements) and losers (those who do not), and
there is every reason to expect that interested parties would lob-
by, before the fact of privatization, for the allocation scheme that
22. Id.
23. See Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology
in Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89
Nw. UNIV. L. REV. 1029 (1995).
24. Smith, supra note 21, at 3.
25. See generally, TERRY L-. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).
26. Id.
1996] 129
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would bring the most benefits their way." So, even if privatiza-
tion of all environmental amenities were plausible (which it is
not), it is at least possible that the high costs of privatization
might exceed its expected benefits.
A third approach to the problem of valuing environmental
amenities is to recognize simply that environmental values are
incommensurable with economic values.28 This approach may
actually be the most realistic, given the current state of economic
science. Rather than solving the problem, though, it simply gives
up on it. It does not even try to provide an acceptable method for
determining how (and how much) nonmarket costs and benefits
should be considered in economic policy making. After admitting
the incommensurability of environmental values, what hope is
there for deriving an objective means of incorporating those val-
ues into economic decision-making and Policy-making concerning
(or affecting) the environment?
As the twenty-first century approaches, it remains unclear
whether nonmarket values can be successfully incorporated into
GNP and other measures of production. One promising sign, at
least, is that governments and nongovernmental organizations
around the world have been taking the problem seriously and
working on it diligently. Rather than directly modifying existing
national income accounts, most governments have focused on
developing separate "satellite" accounts, Which measure the stock
of natural resources, sometimes in non-monetary units, such as
acres or hectares. 9 But efforts to keep separate economic and
environmental indicators seem vain, as policy makers ultimately
are bound to confront problems of deriving common denomina-
tors.
27. See Chulho Jung et al., The Coase Theorem in a Rent-Seeking Society, 15
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 259, 260-62 (1995).
28. See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 217 (1993).
29. This is the approach recommended by the United Nations. See U. N. DEP'T
FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL INFORMATION & POLICY ANALYSIS, STATISTICAL
DIVISION, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTING: INTEGRATED ENVIRONMEN-
TAL AND ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING, U. N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.F/61, U. N.
Sales No. E.93.XVII.12 (1993).
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Some countries, including Poland and Japan, have taken a more
forthright approach to the problem, directly offsetting nonmarket
environmental costs against Gross Domestic Product ("Green
GDP"). Polish economists first began studying the economic costs
of environmental degradation in the mid-1980s, when Poland suf-
fered "a combined economic and ecological crisis of immense
proportions."' After subtracting "reasonably ascertainable" envi-
ronmental costs (including increased health-care expenses, lost
work hours, depletion of natural resource stocks, etc.), they found
that pollution and resource waste were costing the national
economy between ten and twenty percent of GDP each year.3'
These studies were unofficial - Poland has no official Green
GDP index - but they spurred the Polish government to increase
environmental investments (for instance, in sewage treatment
plants) to reduce the economic burdens from environmental deg-
radation.32
In June 1995, Japan's Economic Planning Agency issued its
first Green GDP assessment.3 The assessment concluded that
environmental degradation from air pollution, water pollution, and
ecosystem damage cost the Japanese economy 8.4 trillion yen
(100 billion USD) or two percent of GDP in 1990."4 According
to officials from the Economic Planning Agency, who acknowl-
edged that Green GDP had to be "made more sophisticated to
reflect environmental losses more accurately," these cost esti-
mates were conservative." Indeed, the agency plans in future
Green GDP computations to include domestic and international
costs related to emissions of carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons,
methane gas, and nitrogen oxides.36
Of course, Japan's Green GDP and similar efforts in other
countries are in their infancy. It will be a long time before they
30. Daniel H. Cole, Poland's Progress: Environmental Protection in a Period
of Transition, 2 PARKER SCH. J. E. EuR. L. 279, 279 (1995).
31. Id. at 301.
32. Id. at 300-02.
33. Japan, Environmental Damage Index Shows Decline According to "Green
GDP," Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) (July 13, 1995).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
1996]
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are sufficiently sophisticated to serve as reliable measures of
social welfare. However, they hold the potential for a more ratio-
nal and realistic system of national income accounting. And they
ultimately will determine whether "sustainable development" is a
meaningful concept or just a vacuous slogan.
